Georgetown Professor: US Failure in Afghanistan Result of 20 Years of Mismanagement, Not Single Decision

Paul Miller, a Georgetown University professor and former U.S. National Security Council official, argues in his book 'Choosing Failure' that the U.S. failure in Afghanistan stemmed from two decades of accumulated poor decisions, structural mismanagement, and political shortsightedness.

Miller examines the reasons for the U.S. defeat in its longest war, which ended after 20 years with the Taliban returning to power. He contends there was no single pivotal moment that, if altered, would have led to victory. Instead, a chain of mistakes from the initial military intervention to the troop withdrawal gradually built up to collapse.

Early rapid successes by U.S. forces and local allies in the war's first years created a false impression that the Taliban had been defeated, leading the U.S. to neglect sustained political and security commitments, Miller writes. The Taliban had only been temporarily pushed back. He also cites the U.S. focus on the Iraq war as a factor that exacerbated structural problems in Afghanistan's political and military institutions, allowing the crisis to deepen.

Unlike accounts focused on specific regions or field experiences, the book takes a macro approach, analyzing decisions from the battlefield to the White House. Miller holds all players accountable, including military and civilian officials from both Republican and Democratic administrations.

A U.S. Army veteran, Miller served as director for Afghanistan at the NSC during the late George W. Bush administration and early Barack Obama years. Mike Nelson, a writer and analyst reviewing the book, notes that Miller's insider experience lends credibility to his candid critiques, including of his own decisions.

The book challenges narratives blaming failure solely on politicians or military commanders. Miller argues the U.S. chose failure through half-hearted commitments and unwillingness to bear the costs of a full-scale war. Nelson suggests the book could become a key resource for analytically understanding the war and avoiding future mistakes.